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Abstract—Due to their interesting features, blockchains have
become popular in recent years. They are full-stack systems
where security is a critical factor for their success. The main
focus of this work is to systematize knowledge about security
and privacy issues of blockchains. To this end, we propose a
security reference architecture based on models that demonstrate
the stacked hierarchy of various threats (similar to the ISO/OSI
hierarchy) as well as threat-risk assessment using ISO/IEC
15408. In contrast to the previous surveys [39], [8], [139], [20],
we focus on the categorization of security incidents based on
their origins and using the proposed architecture we present
existing prevention and mitigation techniques. The scope of our
work mainly covers aspects related to decentralized nature of
blockchains, while we mention common operational security
issues and countermeasures only tangentially.
Index Terms—blockchain • distributed ledgers • reference
architecture • threat-risk assessment
I. BLOCKCHAINS AT A GLANCE
The blockchain is a data structure representing an append-
only distributed ledger that consists of entries (a.k.a., trans-
actions) aggregated within ordered blocks. The order of the
blocks is agreed by untrusting participants running a consensus
protocol. A transaction is an elementary data entry that may
contain arbitrary data, e.g., an order to transfer native cryp-
tocurrency (i.e., crypto-tokens), a piece of application code
(i.e., smart contract), the execution orders of such application
code, etc. Transactions sent to a blockchain are validated by
all nodes that maintain a replicated state of the blockchain.
Involved Parties. Blockchains usually involve the following
parties (see Fig. 1).
(1) Consensus nodes actively participate in the underlying
consensus protocol. These nodes can read the blockchain and
write to it by appending new transactions. Besides, they can
validate the blockchain and thus check whether writes of
other consensus nodes are correct and respect a specified
logic. By a combination of writing and validation capabilities,
consensus nodes can prevent malicious behavior (e.g., by not
appending invalid transactions, or not following an incorrect
blockchain view). These nodes disseminate transactions to be
appended within a block to the blockchain. In the context
of Proof-of-Resource protocols (see Sec. IV-B), these nodes
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Fig. 1: Involved parties with their interactions and hierarchy.
are often referred to as miners. (2) Validating nodes read
the entire blockchain, validate it, and disseminate transactions
to be appended to the blockchain. Unlike consensus nodes,
validating nodes cannot write to the blockchain. Thus, they
cannot prevent malicious behavior. However, since they pos-
sess copies of the entire blockchain, they can detect malicious
behavior. (3) Lightweight nodes (a.k.a., clients) benefit from
most of the blockchain functionalities, but they are equipped
only with limited information about the blockchain. These
nodes read only a fragment of the blockchain (usually block
headers) and validate only a small number of transactions that
concern them, while they rely on consensus and validating
nodes for ensuring correctness of the blockchain. Therefore,
they can detect only a limited set of attacks, usually pertaining
to their own transactions.
Features of Blockchains. Blockchains were initially proposed
as open cryptocurrencies, but due to their features, they
became appealing for other applications as well. Blockchains
achieve decentralization via a distributed consensus protocol,
which provides resilience to failures. Usually, participants are
equal and no single entity pose an authority. Another important
result of decentralization is censorship resistance. The ledger is
immutable, requiring a significant quorum of colluding nodes
to change its entries retrospectively. Usually, immutability
is achieved thanks to a cryptographic one-way function that
creates integrity preserving links between blocks. Although
blockchains are highly redundant in a storage of the data, the
main advantage of such redundancy is high availability. This
feature is of special interest to applications that cannot tolerate
outages. Blockchain transactions, as well as actions of protocol
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Fig. 2: Stacked model of reference architecture.
participants, are usually transparent to other participants and
in most cases even to the public. This can be a benefit for
multiple applications, but it can also be seen as a disadvantage
from the anonymity and privacy perspective.
Beside the features that are common in blockchains, some
blockchains may focus on additional features, such as energy
efficiency [60], [10], [75], scalability [95], throughput [25],
[77], [144], privacy [121], accountability [72], etc.
Types of Blockchains. Based on how a new node enters a
consensus protocol, we distinguish the following blockchain
types. (1) Permissionless blockchains allow anyone to join
the consensus protocol without permission. Such participation
can be anonymous, and these protocols are designed to run
over the Internet. To prevent Sybil attacks [45], these schemes
usually require consensus nodes to establish their identities
by running a Proof-of-Resource scheme, while the consensus
power of a node is proportional to its resources invested into
running the protocol. (2) Permissioned blockchains require a
consensus node to obtain permission (and identity) to join the
consensus protocol. The permission is given by a centralized
or federated authority(ies), while nodes usually have equal
consensus power (i.e., one vote per node). These schemes
can be public if they are accessible over the Internet or
private when they are deployed over a restricted network.
(3) Semi-Permissionless blockchains require each new-coming
consensus node to obtain a permission (i.e., cryptocurrency
“stake”); however, such permission can be given by any
stakeholder (i.e., consensus node). These blockchains are
similar to permissionless blockchains, except a consensus is
based on a stake rather than on resources spent. The node’s
consensus power is proportional to the stake it has. Similar to
permissionless blockchains, these systems are usually intended
to be run over the Internet. Novel and interesting aspects of
(semi-)permissionless blockchains are incentives and network
effects that are designed to increase the protocol’s security,
deployability, and adoption.
II. SECURITY REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
Stacked Model. To classify security aspects related to
blockchains, we introduce a simplified stacked model [139]
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Fig. 3: Threat-risk assessment model of reference architecture.
consisting of four layers (see Fig. 2). In contrast to previous
work [139], we preserve only such granularity level that
enables us to isolate various nature of security threats.
(1) The network layer (see Sec. III) consists of the data
representation and network services planes. The data represen-
tation plane deals with storing and encoding of data, while the
network service plane contains discovery and communication
with protocol peers, addressing, routing, and naming services.
(2) The consensus layer (see Sec. IV) deals with ordering
of transactions and we divide it according to a type of the
protocol used to Byzantine Fault Tolerant (e.g., [34], [13],
[29], [47], [92]), Proof-of-Resource (e.g., [95], [48], [99], [89],
[108]), and Proof-of-Stake (e.g., [10], [75]) protocols. (3) The
replicated state machine (RSM) layer (see Sec. V) deals with
the interpretation of transactions, according to which, the state
of the blockchain is updated. Smart contracts involve two
special types of transactions, which represent a programming
code itself and invocations of this code together with input
data. (4) In the application layer (see Sec. VI) we present
the most common end-user functionalities such as crypto-
tokens with wallets that store secrets, oracles that represent
data feeds, and decentralized file systems. Throughout the
paper, we summarize components of particular layers with
their respective security threats and protection techniques.
Threat-Risk Assessment Model. To better capture security-
related aspects of blockchain systems, we introduce a threat-
risk model based on the template of ISO/IEC 15408 [36].
The model includes the following components and actors (see
Fig. 3). Owners are blockchain users who run any node type.
Owners posses crypto-tokens and/or use blockchain-based
applications or services. Assets consist of monetary value (i.e.,
crypto-tokens), blockchain functionalities, as well as services
built on top of them (e.g., exchanges, secure logging, supply
chains). Threat agents are malicious users whose intention
is to steal assets, break functionalities, or disrupt services.
Threats arise from vulnerabilities at the network, in smart
contracts, from consensus protocol deviations, violations of
protocol assumptions, or application-specific dependencies.
Threats facilitate various attacks on assets and services. Coun-
termeasures are provided by the security, safety, incentives,
and reputation techniques that protect owners from threats.
Risks caused by threats and their agents may lead to losses of
monetary assets or service malfunctions and disruptions.
The owners wish to minimize the risk caused by threats that
arise from threat agents. With the stacked model, different
threat agents appear at each layer. At the network layer,
there are service providers including parties managing IP
addresses and DNS names. The threats at this layer come
from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, network partitioning,
de-anonymization, and availability attacks. Countermeasures
contain protection of availability, naming, routing, anonymity,
and data. At the consensus layer, nodes may be malicious
and wish to alter the outcome of the consensus protocol
by deviating from it. The countermeasures include economic
incentives, strong consistency, and decentralization. At the
RSM layer, the threat agents may stand for developers who
(un)intentionally introduce semantic bugs in smart contracts
(intentional bugs represent backdoors).1 Mitigating counter-
measures are safe languages, static/dynamic verification, and
audits. Other threats are related to privacy of data and identity
of users with mitigation techniques using mixers, privacy-
preserving cryptography constructs (e.g., non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs (NIZKs), ring signatures). At the applica-
tion layer, threat agents are unspecified, since any user on
the network who uses a blockchain application may pose a
threat. The threats on this layer arise from false data feeds
and examples of mitigation techniques are authentication or
reputation systems.
III. NETWORK LAYER
Blockchains are overlay networks on top of other networks;
hence, blockchains inherit security and privacy issues from
the underlying networks. Based on permission to join the
blockchain system, the networks are either private or public.
A private network is a network of local devices whose access
is insulated from public networks. The Internet is a public
network of interconnected autonomous systems (ASes) that
relay network traffic at their borders. The network layer is
divided into data representation and network sub-planes (see
Fig. 2). Data representation plane is protected by cryptographic
primitives that ensure data integrity, user authentication, and
optionally confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, non-repudiation,
and accountability. The main blockchain-oriented services
provided by the network layer are peer management and
discovery, which rely on the internals of underlying network,
such as domain name resolution (i.e., DNS), network routing
protocols (e.g., LAN routing for IP, WAN routing such as
BGP). In the following, we discuss pros and cons of private
and public networks and their security threats that affect
overlayed blockchains.
1Note that semantic bugs may occur at each layer; however, we focus only
on smart contract-specific bugs that we put into the RSM layer.
A. Private Networks
A private network ensures low latency, a centralized ad-
ministration, privacy, and meeting regulatory obligations (e.g.,
HIPAA2 for healthcare data). The organization owning the net-
work provides access to local participants as well as to external
ones when required; hence systems deploying private networks
belong to the group of permissioned private blockchains. The
inherent feature of private networks is that authentication and
access control can be provided at the network layer.
1) Pros: Access control is achieved by centralized
authentication of users and assigning them roles. A private
network has full control over routing paths and physical
resources used, which enables regulation of the network topol-
ogy and transmission medium best suited for requirements.
Data privacy is ensured by permissioned settings. User identity
is revealed only within a private group of nodes. They are
immune to external attacks in contrast to public networks (see
Sec. III-B3). Fine-grained authorization controls are applied
by the operator of network resources to implement the security
principle of minimal exposure and thus mitigate insider threat
attacks on a local network. Resource availability is easier
to manage and foresee, as all network participants and the
deployment scenario are known ahead of time.
2) Cons: Virtual Private Network (VPN) connectivity is
required to communicate between private networks spread over
different geographical locations. While VPNs are in general
secure, they inherit the disadvantages of running service over
the Internet. Applicability of private networks is suitable only
for permissioned and private blockchains.
3) Security Threats and Countermeasures: Insiders may
pose a serious threat to security [5]. A compromised node
may already have administrative privileges or obtain them
by exploiting a system, network, or security vulnerabilities.
Countermeasures include regular software updates, user moni-
toring (e.g., SIEM [130]), prevention techniques that minimize
trust and maximize trustworthiness, as well as respecting best
practices [70].
B. Public Networks / the Internet
Public networks provide high decentralization, openness,
and low entry barrier, while network latency, privacy, and
network control are put aside. These networks are naturally
required by all public (permissionless) blockchain systems.
1) Pros: High availability is attractive to multi-homed
nodes since they have alternate routes to send and receive
messages. Multi-homed nodes may find useful to dissemi-
nate blocks across multiple channels, thereby increasing the
chance of blocks being appended to the blockchain. High
decentralization is achieved through geographical dispersion
of nodes. Public peer-to-peer (p2p) networks are harder to
shut down [115]. Openness and low entry barrier on the
Internet are achieved through wide adoption, technology in-
teroperability (e.g., using TCP/IP), economic (e.g., low cost
of broadband connection) and societal (e.g., resistance to
2Health insurance portability and accountability act https://hipaa.com/.
regulations) factors [23]. Statistical resource sharing [87] and
openness are fundamental to a low entry barrier.
2) Cons: Single-point-of-failure – DNS with its hierar-
chy, IP addresses, and ASes are managed by centralized parties
– Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN); in particular, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA). External adversaries pose a threat to public networks.
These adversaries can be classified based on their capabilities
to which the blockchain network may be exposed [117]: (1)
resources under attacker control (e.g., botnets, DNS and BGP
servers), (2) identities are stolen or masqueraded (e.g., IP
addresses participating in an eclipse attack or route manipu-
lation), (3) MITM attacker (i.e., eavesdropping and spoofing),
(4) common vulnerabilities leading to exploits (e.g., observed
in DNS BIND software [52]), (5) revealing secrets (e.g., de-
anonymizing peers). Efficiency – although an average Internet
bandwidth has improved in recent years [1], a distribution
of powerful infrastructure is not uniform, which results in
a different latency among peers, and the overall latency of
the network is increased – this, in turn, may result to loss of
created blocks and thus wasting of consensus power.
3) Security Threats and Countermeasures:
DNS attacks commonly arise from cache poisoning [128]
that mainly affects nodes employing DNS bootstrapping [17]
to retrieve online peers but also users of online blockchain
explorers.3 One countermeasure is a security extension of
DNS, called DNSSEC, which provides authentication and data
integrity. In addition to standard DNS, name resolution can
also be made using alternate DNS servers [40].
Routing attacks are traffic route diversions, hijacking, or
DoS attacks. Beside simple data eavesdropping or modifica-
tion, these attacks may lead to network partitioning, which
in turn raises the risks of 51% attacks or selfish mining
attacks (see Sec. IV). Countermeasures suggest nodes to be
multi-homed (or using VPN) for route diversity, choosing
extra peers whose connections do not pass through the same
ASes, preference of peers hosted on the same AS within the
same /24 prefix (to reduce risk of partitions), and fetching
the same block from multiple peers [3]. Another mitigation is
SABRE [2], a secure relay network that runs alongside with
the Bitcoin network. The BGPsec [80] is a security extension
for BGP used between neighboring ASes, and it provides
assurance of route origin and propagation by cryptographic
verification.
Eclipse attacks hijack all connections of a node to the
blockchain network. Hence, all traffic received by the node
is under the full control of the attacker. Eclipse attacks arise
from threats on DNS and routing in the network as well as they
may be a result of vulnerabilities in p2p protocols [66], [143],
[85]). Eclipse attack increase chances of selfish mining and
double spending attacks (see Sec. IV) – the eclipsed victims
may vote for an attacker’s chain. Countermeasures: Improving
3Note that blockchain explorers might be also affected by compromised
certification authorities. Protection relying on DNS is DNS-based Authentica-
tion of Named Entities (DANE), while Certificate Transparency is mitigation
relaying on centralized public logs.
randomness in choosing peers was proposed in work [66] by
several rules that manage the peer table. Another mitigation
strategy against eclipse attacks is to use redundant network
links or out-of-band connections to verify transactions (e.g.,
by a blockchain explorer). Also, note that countermeasures for
DNS and routing attacks are applicable here as well.
DoS attacks on connectivity of consensus nodes may result
in a loss of consensus power, thus preventing consensus
nodes from being rewarded [67]. For validating nodes, this
attack leads to disruption of some blockchain dependent
services [124]. Countermeasures: One mitigation is to peer
only with white-listed nodes. Methods to prevent volumetric
DDoS include on-premise filtering (i.e., with an extra network
device), cloud filtering (i.e., redirection of traffic through a
cloud when DDoS is detected or through a cloud DDoS
mitigation service), or hybrid filtering [4] (i.e., combinations
of the previous two).
DoS attacks on local resources, such as memory and stor-
age, may reduce the peering and consensus capabilities [81]
of nodes. An example attack is flooding the network with
low fee transactions (a.k.a., penny-flooding), which may cause
memory pool depletion, resulting in a system crash. Possible
mitigation is raising the minimum transaction fee and rate-
limit to the number of transactions. Several mitigating tech-
niques are applied to Bitcoin [18] nodes including scoring DoS
attacks and banning misbehaving peers.
Identity revealing attacks are conducted by linking the IP
address of a node with identity propagated in transactions [15],
[91]. Traffic analysis using Sybil listeners can reveal the
linkage of node IP addresses and their transactions [33]. Coun-
termeasures include using VPNs or anonymization services,
such as Tor. See Sec. V-A1 for further identity and privacy-
protecting mechanisms at the RSM level.
IV. CONSENSUS LAYER
The consensus layer of the stacked model deals with the
ordering of transactions. It includes three main categories
of consensus protocols with regard to different principles of
operation and thus their security aspects. First, we focus on the
security aspects that are generic to all categories of consensus
protocols, and then we detail each category.
A. Generic Attacks
1) Violations of Protocol Assumptions:
Adversarial Centralization of Consensus Power. In these
attacks, a design assumption about the decentralized distribu-
tion of consensus power is violated. Examples of this category
are 51% attacks for PoR and PoS protocols as well as 13 of
Byzantine nodes for BFT protocols (and their combinations).
In a 51% attack, the majority of the consensus power is held
by the adversary, thus also the result of the protocol is under
its control. In Byzantine attacks, a quorum of 13 adversarial
consensus nodes might cause the protocol being disrupted or
even halted. As a design-oriented countermeasure, it is im-
portant to promote decentralization by incentive schemes that
reward honest participation and discourage [90] or punish [28],
[41] protocol violations.
Time-Validation Attacks. Usually, besides system time,
nodes in PoW and PoS maintain network time that is computed
as the median value of the time obtained from the peers.
Such a time is often put into the block header, while nodes,
upon receiving a block, validate whether it fits freshness
constraints. An attacker can exploit this approach by connect-
ing a significant number of nodes and propagate inaccurate
timestamps, which can slow down or speed up the victim
node’s network time [22]. When such a desynchronized node
creates a block, this block can be discarded by a network due
to freshness constraints. To avoid de-synchronization attacks,
a node can build a reputation list of trusted peers or employ
a timestamping authority [132].
2) Double Spending: This attack is possible due to
the creation of two or more conflicting blocks with the same
height, resulting in inconsistencies called forks. Thus, some
crypto-tokens might be temporarily spent in both conflicting
blocks, while only a single block is later included in the honest
chain. To prevent this attack in permissionless blockchains, it
is recommended to wait a certain amount of time (i.e., a few
next blocks) until a block “is settled.”
B. Proof-of-Resource Protocols (PoR)
Protocols from this category require nodes to prove a spend-
ing of a scarce resource in a lottery-based fashion [72]. Scarce
resources may stand for: (1) Computation that is represented
by Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum).
(2) Storage used in the setting of Proof-of-Space protocols [48]
(e.g., Spacecoin [102], SpaceMint [71]). (3) Crypto-tokens
spent for Proof-of-Burn protocols (e.g., Slimcoin [99]). (4)
Combinations and modification of the previous types, such as
storage and computation, called Proof-of-Retrievability (e.g.,
Permacoin [89]) and storage over time, which is represented
by Proof-of-Space protocols (e.g., Filecoin [108]).
PoR protocols belong to the first generation of consensus
protocols, and they are mostly based on Nakamoto Con-
sensus [95] that utilize PoW, inheriting its pros (e.g., high
scalability) and cons (e.g., low throughput). For the detailed
analysis of several PoW designs, we refer the reader to [149].
1) Pros: In PoR protocols, malicious overriding of the
history of blockchain (or its part) requires spending at least
the same amount of resources as was spent for its creation.
This is in contrast to principles of PoS protocols, where a big
enough coalition may override the history with almost no cost.
2) Cons: stand mainly for a high operational cost.
Moreover, these protocols provide only probabilistic finality,
which enables attacks forking the last few blocks of the chain.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations:
Selfish Mining: In selfish mining [56], an adversary attempts
to privately build a secret chain and reveal it to the public
only when an honest chain is “catching up” with the secret
one. The longest chain rule causes honest miners to adopt the
attacker’s chain and invalidate the honest chain, thus wasting
their consensus power. This attack is more efficient when
consensus power of a selfish miner reaches some threshold
(e.g., 30%). The selfish mining strategy was later general-
ized [120] and extended to other variants that increase the
profit of the attacker [96]. Countermeasures: (1) For the case
of the longest chain rule, the first introduced mitigation is
uniform tie breaking [56], which tells consensus nodes to
choose the chain to extend uniformly at random, regardless
of which one they received first. However, this technique is
less effective when assuming network delays [120]. (2) As
the longest chain rule enables this attack, it is recommended
to use other fork choice rules that also account for the quality
of solutions and make the decision deterministic, as opposed
to a uniform tie breaking. An example of such a rule is to
select the block based on the smallest hash value. Another
example is to include partial solutions [145], [103] or full
(orphaned) blocks [127], [148] for computation of block’s
quality. (3) Another option for a deterministic fork choice
rule is using a pseudo-random function [76], which moreover
provides unpredictability, hence an attacker cannot determine
his chances to win a tie. (4) PoW protocols can be combined
with BFT protocols, where PoW is used only for joining the
protocol and BFT for consensus itself (e.g., [77], [144], [76]).
Feather Forking: In this attack [88], the adversary creates
incentives for rational miners to collectively censor certain
transactions. Before a mining round begins, an adversary
announces that he will not extend the block containing black-
listed transactions, and thus will attempt to extend a forked
chain. Although this strategy is not profitable for the adversary
and the success rate is dependent on his consensus power,
rational honest nodes prefer to join on the censorship to avoid
the potential loss. Countermeasures: design-oriented protec-
tion is to minimize the chance of the attacker being successful,
which can be done by including (and rewarding) partial
solutions [145], [114], [103] or full orphaned blocks [127],
[148] into branch difficulty computation.
Pool Specific Attacks: Since PoR protocols are usually
based on a lottery having a single winner [95], rewarding for
participation imposes a high payout variance for solo miners
(i.e., once in a few years). As a consequence, mining pools
emerged and caused centralization of the mining power, which
may result in selfish mining, double spending, or 51% attacks.
Countermeasures: Non-outsourceable scratch-off puzzles [90]
avoid creation of pools but require each consensus node to
meet high demands on connectivity and storage, as opposed
to centralized pools, where only a pool operator needs to
meet these demands. If pools are acceptable, their size can
be controlled by protocols that reward partial solutions [145],
[114], [103] and thus minimize payout variance. For a detailed
analysis of rewarding schemes in pools, we refer the reader
to [116].
C. Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) Voting Protocols
BFT protocols represent voting-based [72] consensus pro-
tocols that utilize Byzantine agreement and a state ma-
chine replication [122]. These protocols assume a fully
connected topology, broadcasting messages, and a master-
replicas hierarchy. Synchronous examples of this category
are PBFT [34], RBFT [7], eventually synchronous examples
are BFT-SMaRt [13], Tendermint [25], Byzantine Paxos [29],
BChain [47], and asynchronous examples are SINTRA [31]
and HoneyBadgerBFT [92]. For more details, we refer
the reader to review of BFT protocols and their practi-
cal applications in both permissioned and permissionless
blockchains [32].
1) Pros: BFT protocols provide high throughput and a
low latency finality. To face their scalability limitation, BFT
protocols are often combined with PoS or PoW. This is in
line with a lottery approach [72] for selecting a portion of
all nodes, referred to as committee, which further runs BFT
consensus (e.g., Algorand [60], Zilliqa [152], DFINITY [64]).
2) Cons: The main con of traditional BFT protocols [29],
[34] is a low scalability caused by a high communication com-
plexity (i.e., Θ(n2)). Since these protocols can work efficiently
only with a limited number of consensus nodes, they can be
used in their pure form only in permissioned blockchains.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations: Many BFT pro-
tocols assume synchronous delivery of messages. However,
this assumption can be violated by unpredictable network
scheduler, as demonstrated on PBFT protocol [92]. This fact
motivates asynchronous BFT protocols that can be based
on threshold-based cryptography, which enables reliable and
consistent broadcast [31], [92]. Issues with scalability and
throughput can be dealt with by applying cryptographic con-
structs [19], [30], [125] and partitioning consensus nodes
into shards that process transactions in parallel [77], [144].
Another option is to prune the number of nodes running BFT
into committees [60], which, however, reduces security level
of BFT and provides only probabilistic security guarantees
depending on the committee size.
D. Proof-of-Stake Protocols (PoS)
Similar to the PoR category, PoS protocols are based on the
lottery approach [72]. However, in contrast to PoR, no scarce
resource is spent; instead, the nodes are required “to prove in-
vestment” of crypto-tokens in order to participate in a protocol,
and thus potentially earn interest from the invested amount.
The concept of PoS was first time proposed in Peercoin [119]
as a combination with PoW – each node has its particular
difficulty for PoW, which is based on the age of the coins
a node owns. Although there exist a few pure PoS protocols
(e.g., Chains of Activity [10], Ouroboros [75]), the trend is
to combine them in a hybrid setting with PoR (e.g., Proof-
of-Activity [11], Peercoin [119], Snow White [12]) or BFT
protocols (e.g., Algorand [60]). In particular, a combination
of PoS with BFT represents a promising approach, which
takes advantages of both lottery and voting (i.e., scalability
and throughput), while no resources are wasted.
1) Pros: The main feature of PoS protocols, as
compared to PoR, is their energy efficiency. Although some
PoS protocols are often combined with a PoR technique (e.g.,
[12], [119]), the overall energy spent is much less than in the
case of pure PoR protocols.
2) Cons: Introduction of PoS protocols has brought PoS
specific issues and attacks, while these protocols are still not
formally proven to be secure. Next, PoS protocols are semi-
permissionless – a node needs to first obtain a stake from any
of existing nodes to join the protocol.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations:
Nothing-at-Stake: Since generating a block in PoS does not
cost any energy, a node can extend two or more conflicting
blocks without risking its stake, and hence increase a chance
to be rewarded. Such behavior increases the number of forks
and thus time to finality. Countermeasures: Deposit-based
solutions (e.g., [28]) require nodes to make a deposit during
some fixed period/round and checkpoint-based solutions (e.g.,
[28], [24], [41]) employ “state freezing” at periodic snapshots
of the blockchain, while the blockchain can be reversed
maximally up to the recent checkpoint. Another option is to
use cryptographic solutions [83] for revealing identity and a
private key of a node that signs two conflicting blocks. Another
countermeasure is to use backward penalization of nodes that
produced two or more conflicting chains [41], [28]. Finally,
PoS protocols can be combined with BFT approaches, and
thus forks can hardly occur (e.g., [60]).
Grinding Attack: If the leader or committee producing a
block is determined before the round starts, then the attacker
can bias this process to increase his chances of being selected
in future. For example, if a PoS protocol takes only a hash
of the previous block for the election process, the leader of a
block may bias a hash value by suitably adjusting the content
of the block in a few attempts. Countermeasures: A grinding
attack can be prevented by performing a fresh leader election
by an interaction of nodes (e.g., the secure multiparty coin
flipping protocol [75]) or by private checking whether the
output of a verifiable random function (VRF) is below a certain
stake-specific threshold (e.g., [60]). The input of the VRF
is the user’s private key and the randomness unambiguously
bound to the previous block; hence each consensus node
computes the only VRF output during each round.
Denial of Service on a Leader/Committee: If a leader or a
committee are publicly determined before the round starts [75],
then the adversary may conduct a DoS attack against them
and thus cause a restart of the round – this might be repeated
until adversary’s desired nodes are elected. Countermeasures:
A prevention technique was proposed in Algorand [60] –
a node privately determines whether it is a potential leader
(or committee member), and immediately releases a block
candidate (or a vote) – hence, after publishing this data, it
is too late for a DoS attack. The concept of VRF approach
was also utilized in other protocols (e.g., [42], [64]).
Long-Range Attack: In this attack [26] (a.k.a., posterior cor-
ruption [41]), an adversary can “bribe” previously influential
consensus nodes to sell their private keys or steal the private
keys by other means. Since consensus nodes may exchange
their crypto-tokens for fiat money anytime, selling their keys
impose no expenses and risk. If the attacker accumulates keys
with enough stake in the past, he may rerun the consensus
protocol and rewrite the history of the blockchain. A vari-
ant of long-range attack that considers transaction fee-based
rewarding and infrequent or no check-points is denoted as a
stake-bleeding attack [59]. Countermeasures: One mitigation
is to lock the deposit for a longer time than the period
of participation in the consensus [8]. The next mitigation
technique is frequent periodic check-pointing, which causes
the irreversibility of the blockchain with respect to the last
checkpoint. Another option is to apply key-evolving cryptog-
raphy [58] and forward-secure digital signatures [9], which
require users to evolve their private keys, while already used
keys are erased [42]. Hence, signatures cannot be forged
in the case of compromise. The third mitigation technique
is enforcing a chain density in a time-domain [59] for the
protocols where the expected number of participants in each
round is known (e.g., [75]). The last mitigation technique is
context-sensitive transactions, which put the hash of a recent
valid block into a transaction itself [59].
V. REPLICATED STATE MACHINE LAYER
This layer is responsible for the interpretation of transac-
tions and concerning security threats are related to the privacy
of users, confidentiality of data, and smart contract-specific
bugs (involving bugs in code and compilers).
A. Transaction Protection
Mostly, transactions containing plain-text data are digitally
signed by private keys of users [95], [54], enabling anybody
to verify the validity of transactions by corresponding public
keys. However, such an approach provides only pseudonymous
identities that can be traced to real identities, and moreover,
it does not ensure confidentiality of data [57].
1) Security Threats and Countermeasures:
Privacy Threats to User Identity. In most of the
blockchains, user identities can be linked with their
transactions by various deanonymization techniques, such
as network flow analysis, address clustering, transaction
fingerprinting [57], [14], [110]. Moreover, blockchains
designed with anonymity and privacy features (e.g., Zcash,
Monero) are also vulnerable to a few attack strategies [74],
[94]. Countermeasures: Various means are used for
obfuscation of user identities, including centralized [86], [21]
and decentralized [118], [16], [151] mixing services, ring
signatures [138], [98], and non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs (NIZKs) [121]. Some mixers enable internal linkability
by involved parties [86] or linkability by the mixers [21],
which are also potential threats. Unlinkability for all
parties can be achieved by multi-party computation [151],
blinding signatures [137], or layered encryption [118]. Ring
signatures [113] provide unlinkability to users in a signing
group [98], [138], enabling only verification of correctness of
a signature, without revealing an identity of a signer.
Privacy of data. NIZKs [121], [51] and blind signatures [65],
[137] can be used for preservation of data privacy. Another
method is homomorphic encryption [100], [104], which en-
ables to compute some operations over encrypted messages.
Privacy and confidentiality for smart contract platforms can
be achieved through trusted transaction managers [78], trusted
hardware [35], and secure multi-party computations [153].
B. Smart Contracts
Smart contracts, introduced to automate legal con-
tracts [131], now serve as a method for building decentral-
ized applications on blockchains. They are usually written
in a blockchain-specific programming language that may be
Turing-complete and contain arbitrary programming logic or
only serve for limited purposes. In the following, we describe
these two contrasting types of smart contract languages.
1) Security Threats and Countermeasures:
Turing-Complete Languages. An important aspect of this
language category is a large attack surface due to the possibil-
ity of arbitrary programming logic. Examples of this category
are Serpent and Solidity, while Solidity is the most popular
and widely-used one. Serpent [55] is a high-level language
that was designed to be simple and similar to the Python
language. However, Serpent was designed in untyped fashion,
lacking out-of-bound access checks of arrays and accepting
invalid code by compilers [146], which opened the door for
plenty of vulnerabilities. Hence, Serpent showed to be as
an unsuccessful attempt to simplify the coding phase. So-
lidity [53] is an object-oriented statically-typed language that
is primarily used by Ethereum platform. Contracts written in
Solidity can contain various types of vulnerabilities [6], [84],
which resulted in many incidents in the past. Mitigations of
such vulnerabilities can be done by code analysis tools [101],
[133], respecting best practices [126], [134], utilizing known
design patterns [141], audits, and testing. Various approaches
are used for source code analysis, such as linters [133], [109],
[46], fuzzers [73], semantic-based program verifiers [68], and
other symbolic code analyzers [135] often using control flow-
graph techniques. Note that source code of contracts is often
not public in contrast to their bytecode. For this reason, byte-
code decompilers [150], [129], analyzers [97], and automated
exploit generators [79] can be utilized.
Turing-Incomplete Languages. The main pro of this cate-
gory is its design-oriented goal of small attack surface and
emphasis on safety but at the cost of limited expressiveness.
Examples of this category are Pact, Scilla, Vyper. Pact [107]
is a declarative language intended for Kadena blockchain
and provides type inference and module-guarded tables to
prevent direct access to the module. Pact is equipped with
the ability to express and check properties of its programs,
also leveraging SMT solvers. Scilla [123] is designed to
achieve expressiveness and tractability while enabling formal
reasoning about contract behavior. Every computation utilizes
the automata-based model, and computations are realized as
standalone atomic transitions that strictly terminate. Scilla
enables external calls only as the last instruction of a contract,
which simplifies proving safety and thus mitigates a few vul-
nerabilities. Vyper [27] is an experimental language designed
to ease the audit of smart contracts and increase security – it
contains strong typing and bounds/overflows checks.
VI. APPLICATION LAYER
The application layer contains end-user services and ap-
plications that are built on top of blockchains; therefore the
security threats are specific to particular types of applications.
In the following, we elaborate on common application types.
A. Crypto-Tokens & Wallets
Besides cryptocurrencies that provide native crypto-tokens,
there are other blockchain applications using crypto-tokens
for the purpose of providing owners with rights against the
third party (i.e., counterparty tokens) or with a possibility
of transferring asset ownership (i.e., ownership tokens) [93].
All types of tokens require the protection of private keys and
secrets linked with user identities. For this purpose, two main
categories of wallets have emerged – self-sovereign wallets
and hosted wallets [50], [20], [69]. Beside technical risks, all
crypto-tokens are exposed to regulatory risk, while non-native
tokens are in addition exposed to legal risks [93].
Self-Sovereign Wallets. Users of self-sovereign wallets lo-
cally store their private keys and directly interact with the
blockchain platform using the keys to sign transactions. The
instances of these wallets differ in several aspects. One of
them is isolation of the keys – there are software wallets that
store the keys within the user PC (e.g., Bitcoin Core, Electrum
Wallet, MyEtherWallet) as well as hardware wallets that store
keys in a sealed storage, while they expose only signing func-
tionality (e.g., Trezor, Ledger, KeepKey, BitLox, CoolBitX).
Another type of wallets enables to customize functionality and
security by a smart contract (e.g., TrezorMultisig2of3 [136],
Ethereum MultiSigWallet [38]).
Hosted Wallets. Hosted wallets require a centralized party to
provide an interface for interaction with the wallet and thus
blockchain. If a hosted wallet has full control over private keys,
it is referred to as a server-side wallet (e.g., Coinbase, Circle
Pay Wallet, Luno Wallet), while in the case of keys stored
in the users’ browsers, the wallets are referred to as client-
side wallets (e.g., Blockchain Wallet, BTC Wallet, Mycelium
Wallet, CarbonWallet, Citowise Wallet). We refer the reader
to works [69], [50] for a security overview of miscellaneous
wallet solutions.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: Since server-side
wallets accounted for several compromises [142], [111], [112],
their popularity have attenuated in favor of client-side wallets.
Client-side wallets do not expose private keys to a centralized
party, but they still trust in the online interface provided by
such a party, and moreover, their availability is dependent on
such a party. Contrary, self-sovereign wallets do not trust in a
third party nor rely on its availability. However, these wallets
are susceptible to key theft (i.e., malware [44], keyloggers [20],
[106]). Possible mitigation of these attacks are hardware wal-
lets displaying details of transactions to the user, while the user
confirms signing by a button (e.g., Trezor, Ledger, KeepKey).
Another option is to protect self-sovereign wallets by multi-
factor/(-step) authentication using multi-signatures [136], [38],
threshold-based cryptography [62], or air-gapped OTPs [69].
B. Oracles
Oracles are trusted entities that provide data reflecting
the state of the world beyond the blockchain. Prediction
markets (e.g., Augur [105], Gnosis [61]) were created for the
purpose of trading the outcome of events – individuals are
incentivized to accurately wager on these outcomes, which
serve as data feeds. Dedicated data feeds build on existing
blockchain platforms (e.g., PDFS [63], Oraclize [37]) or create
dedicated oracle networks (e.g., ChainLink [49], Witnet [43])
that internally run consensus protocol.
1) Security Threats: The data provision time of pre-
diction markets may be long for many applications and the
provided set of data events may be also limited. In contrast,
dedicated data feeds enrich a data domain and significantly
shorten a provision time; however, they often rely on a trusted
party [63], [37], which may misbehave or accidentally produce
wrong data. Oracle networks eliminate trust in a single party
by a consensus of the group; however, threats related to
the consensus layer of this functionality also needs to be
considered. Moreover, for providers that offer authenticated
data feeds using trusted hardware [37], [147], a vulnerability
in trusted hardware may result in a compromise of the entire
data feed.
C. Decentralized Filesystems (DFs)
DFs serve as a data storage infrastructure running native
blockchains (e.g., Storj [140], Filecoin [108], Permacoin [89]).
DFs borrow ideas from peer-to-peer file storage systems,
but they additionally incentivize data preservation by crypto-
tokens. Alternatively to native DFs, decoupling of the stored
data from the blockchain data is also possible in a few forms
of integration with existing blockchains. Beside naı¨ve storage
of integrity proofs to off-chain data, cloud services (e.g.,
Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, IBM), and distributed
hash tables (DHT) [82] are promising approaches.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: While native DFs
handle availability and decentralization using consensus layer
mechanisms, cloud services and DHT solutions rely on a
provider’s infrastructure and dedicated file sharing networks,
respectively. Sybil attacks claiming redundant storage of the
same piece of data can be prevented by unique encryption of
each data copy [140], which, however, puts higher distribution
overhead on clients. Another attack might target the reputation
of the network by dropping data and its redundant copies. A
simple mitigation technique is to use multiple consensus nodes
for a file upload, which diminishes chances of the attack being
successful. Next mitigation is to hide the number of redundant
copies using erasure encoding [140].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on the systematization of knowl-
edge about security aspects of blockchain systems. We pro-
posed security reference architecture as a stacked model,
which we further projected into a threat-risk assessment model
that presents various threats and countermeasures. The pro-
posed stack model consists of four layers: (1) network layer,
(2) consensus layer, (3) replicated state machine layer, and (4)
application layer. At each of the layers, we surveyed specific
security issues and mitigation techniques. In future work, we
plan to amend the security issues of each layer by details and
evidence about real-world incidents.
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